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Abstract
Dictators’ survival depends on the effectiveness of their coup-proofing tactics. Yet,
coup-proofing strategies can become ineffective in the presence of certain structural
conditions that enhance the resources, organizational power, and coordination capac-
ity of the army. One such structural condition is the presence of spatial rivalry,
international rivalry over disputed territory. Autocratic incumbents invested in spatial
rivalries need to strengthen the military in order to compete with a foreign adversary.
The imperative of developing a strong army puts dictators in a paradoxical situation:
to compete with a rival state, they must empower the very agency, the military, that
is most likely to threaten their own survival in office. This logic suggests that author-
itarian regimes engaged in spatial rivalries will be more vulnerable to coups. Indeed,
relying on the most comprehensive coup dataset to date, this study reveals that ri-
valry over territory is a robust predictor of coups against autocrats. The findings
carry implications for research on civil-military relations, international rivalries, and
organizational dynamics within authoritarian regimes.
∗Adrian Florea is Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the
University of Glasgow.
Introduction
Contrary to the folk view, being a dictator is no easy feat. Unlike leaders of consolidated
democracies, tyrants need to constantly watch their back and keep their militaries in check
to avoid being ousted in a coup d’e´tat.1 To make themselves less vulnerable to coups, au-
thoritarian leaders adopt three main strategies: counterbalancing (the creation of multiple
coercive agencies that compete with one another for influence and resources); loyalty buy-off
(the distribution of private benefits to the army top-brass); and ethnic stacking (the ap-
pointment of loyal co-ethnics/co-religionists at the helm of the security apparatus). Yet,
coup-proofing can be ineffective in the presence of certain structural conditions that increase
the organizational power of the military establishment and decrease officers’ coordination
costs.2 Existing studies overwhelmingly focus on domestic conditions, such as protest, re-
pression, or civil war, that impinge on autocrats’ ability to insulate themselves from coups.3
Less attention has been given to external structural conditions that can increase plotter
1Military coups are the most frequent form of irregular exit from office for dictators. See Giacomo
Chiozza and Hein E. Goemans, Leaders and International Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2011); Hein E. Goemans, “Which Way Out? The Manner and Consequences of Losing Office,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 54, no. 4 (2008): 771-94.
2Structural conditions typically encompass situations that facilitate collective action. See Aaron Belkin
and Evan Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47,
no. 5 (2003): 594-620; Sidney Tarrow, Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
3Curtis Bell and Jun Koga Sudduth, “The Causes and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution (forthcoming); Abel Escriba`-Folch, “Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under
Autocracy,” International Political Science Review 34, no. 5 (2013): 543-60; Sharon E. Nepstad, “Mutiny
and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and
Syria,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 337-49; Philip Roessler, “The Enemy Within: Personal
Rule, Coups, and Civil Wars in Africa,” World Politics 63, no. 2 (2012): 300-46; Milan W. Svolik, The
Politics of Authoritarian Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Thorin Wright, “Territorial
Revision and State Repression,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 3 (2014): 375-87.
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capacity and can undercut a dictator’s efforts to keep the armed forces in check. One
such external structural condition is spatial rivalry — international rivalry over territory.
Given the high salience of territory for domestic audiences (a disputed area can hold sym-
bolic, strategic, or material value), autocrats are compelled to empower the army in order
to compete successfully with a foreign adversary. Because few domestic actors can question
the need to defend contested territory, dictators’ coup-proofing efforts can be undermined
by the exigency of responding to external threats. Spatial rivalry helps the military con-
solidate resources, fosters officer professionalization, and reduces the costs of coordinated
action against a despot. Therefore, international rivalry over territory can erode a dictator’s
coup-proofing tactics and can increase the army’s ability to supply coups. If spatial rivalry
is structural to the regime, coup-proofing is likely to be less effective. When the army is
needed to compete with a foreign rival, an autocrat will be more constrained in implementing
coup-proofing measures. In essence, spatial rivalry creates a fundamental moral hazard in
authoritarian regimes: the very resources that enable the army to compete internationally
can also strengthen its position as a domestic player and can empower it to act against a
dictator.4
For a quick illustration of this process, consider the removal of the first Algerian presi-
dent, Ahmed Ben Bella, on June 19, 1965 in a coup orchestrated by his defense minister and
former associate, Houari Boumediene. After gaining independence in 1962, Algeria became
enmeshed in a long-running rivalry with Morocco over disputed territories.5 In 1963, the
two rivals fought a short conflict, “The Sand War,” during which Rabat displayed superior
military strength. In Algiers, the outcome of the conflict led to the realization that a military
4Milan W. Svolik, “Contracting on Violence: The Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military
Intervention in Politics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 5 (2013): 765-94.
5The dispute started before Morocco and Algeria became independent. The two countries remain locked
in a strategic rivalry over border territories and the status of Western Sahara.
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build-up was imperative for national survival.6 As a consequence, with Moscow’s assistance,
Algeria embarked on a military modernization program which transformed the army into the
most influential domestic player. At the end of the war with Morocco, relations between Ben
Bella and Boumediene soured over the president’s efforts to neutralize the growing influence
of the army in the nascent government architecture. In particular, Ben Bella attempted to
establish stronger security forces and political organizations (a counterbalancing strategy)
in the hope that these tactics would bolster his position vis-a`-vis the army.7 The president’s
efforts to build up political and security institutions as counterweights to the armed forces
drew the ire of the military establishment which felt both empowered by the rivalry-driven
militarization program and threatened by Ben Bella’s efforts to marginalize it.8 Fearing
encroachment on the army’s “reserved role” in Algerian politics, on June 19, 1965, defense
minister Boumediene ousted Ben Bella in a bloodless coup.9
The removal of Ben Bella is a prototypical case of an autocratic coup executed in the
shadow of spatial rivalry. Rather than an isolated event, however, the 1965 Algerian coup is
indicative of a more systematic pattern. Relying on the most comprehensive coup dataset
to date,10 this study finds that, controlling for other domestic and external structural con-
ditions, spatial rivalry is a significant predictor of both coup attempts and coup successes.
6David Ottaway and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1970); Philip C. Naylor, Historical Dictionary of Algeria, 3rd edition (Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).
7Ottaway and Ottaway, Algeria, 123; Naylor, Historical Dictionary of Algeria, 183.
8Anthony H. Cordesman, A Tragedy of Arms: Military and Security Developments in the Maghreb
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 151.
9Officially, Boumediene declared that Ben Bella’s poor management of the economy was the major reason
behind the latter’s removal. In a revelatory radio address, however, Boumedienne stated that Ben Bella’s
“government by the whim” pushed the military to act. Miami News, “Algerian Coup Ousts Ben Bella as
‘Dictator,’” (1965): 1A.
10Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New
Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2 (2011): 249-59.
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The evidence suggests that those autocrats who are engaged in international competition
over disputed territories are more likely to be ousted in coups d’e´tat.
This finding is important because it challenges conventional wisdom which holds that
interstate conflict, or, more generally, the presence of external threat, can enhance state ca-
pacity and centralization of domestic power.11 When it comes to nondemocratic countries,
several studies examining patterns of authoritarian leader survival suggest that interstate
wars, militarized interstate disputes, or international threats can foster regime consolidation
and can inhibit coups. In particular, some consensus seems to have emerged around the
idea that foreign conflicts, disputes, or threats foreclose key pathways through which gen-
erals might conspire to overthrow a nondemocratic leader.12 For example, Desch contends
that external threats make states more cohesive because they “reduce what Albert Hirsh-
man labeled the ‘exit’ option and tend to suppress the ‘voice’ option, thus leaving only the
11Michael N. Desch, “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?,” International Organization 50, no.
2 (1996): 237-68; Douglas M. Gibler, “Outside-In: The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 4 (2010): 519-42; Douglas M. Gibler and Steven V. Miller, “External
Territorial Threat, State Capacity, and Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 5 (2014): 634-46;
Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, War and State Making: The Shaping of Global Powers (Boston,
MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Cameron Thies, “War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America,” American
Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 451-65; Charles Tilly. Coercion, Capital, and European States,
AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).
12Cemal Eren Arbatli and Ekim Arbatli, “External Threats and Political Survival: Can Dispute Involve-
ment Deter Coup Attempts?” Conflict Management and Peace Science 33, no. 2 (2016): 115-52; Aaron
Belkin and Evan Schofer, “Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict,” Security Studies 14,
no. 1 (2005): 140-77; R. Blake McMahon and Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime
Security through and from the Armed Forces,” American Political Science Review 109, no. 2 (2015): 297-313;
Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bo¨hmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship
between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (2012): 355-71; Varun Pi-
plani and Caitlin Talmadge, “When War Helps Civil-military Relations: Prolonged Interstate Conflict and
the Reduced Risk of Coups,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming).
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‘loyalty’ option,”13 while McMahon and Slantchev argue that external threats help induce
military loyalty and, thus, lower the probability of a coup.14 Some propose that a highly
militarized international environment allows dictators to deploy potential coup plotters into
the war zone, create rifts among officers and, hence, secure control of the military establish-
ment.15 Others contend that wars, or even militarized interstate disputes, complicate coup
plotting and execution, and focus officers’ attention outward.16 A common, diversionary
war, argument posits that conflict generates coup-inhibiting “rally-around-the-flag” effects
and unifies the civilian leadership with the military (the public tends to be averse to coups
during periods of international instability).17 Further, a more recent claim holds that, dur-
ing high-hostility crises, leaders can commit more credibly to substantial resource transfers
towards the military top-brass, which is likely to be appeased and, thus, less inclined to
contemplate ousting the leader.18 Moreover, Pilster and Bo¨hmelt argue that a challenging
international environment “reduces the probability of agency drifts in the form of military
coups and increases the political costs from a loss of military effectiveness. External threats
13Desch, “War and Strong States,” 241.
14McMahon and Slantchev, “The Guardianship Dilemma,” 307. According to McMahon and Slantchev,
the military’s willingness to remain loyal to the leader is complicated by uncertainty about the external
threat environment. In their view, rulers are able to strengthen their militaries without triggering a coup
only when there is common knowledge about threat severity. McMahon and Slantchev embrace a broader
understanding of external threats as threats originating from outside the government; hence, “external”
threats can be domestic or foreign.
15Belkin and Schofer, “Coup Risk,” 151; Chiozza and Goemans, Leaders and International Conflict ;
Goemans, “Which Way Out?,” 775.
16Piplani and Talmadge, “When War Helps,” 18.
17On leaders’ diversionary incentives, see Amy Oakes, Diversionary War: Domestic Unrest and Interna-
tional Conflict (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
18Arbatli and Arbatli, “External Threats and Political Survival.” As discussed below, the credible com-
mitment mechanism can also produce an expectation in the opposite direction: during times of external
hostility, leaders can commit to resource disbursements towards the military, but the substantial resources
allocated to the army can also be used to topple a dictator.
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can therefore be expected to reduce the need for and attractiveness of institutional coup-
proofing as an ex-ante control mechanism.”19 Finally, McMahon conjectures that external
threats tend to induce regime loyalty within the military establishment. In his view, when
external threats are particularly severe, officers “prefer to remain loyal rather than undertake
the risks and assume the costs associated with a coup.”20
This article reveals that it’s not the mere presence but the nature or the type of exter-
nal threat that seems to matter for autocratic leader survival. Different types of external
threats have different kinds of domestic consequences. In the presence of territorial rivalries,
dictators may be less successful at implementing coup-proofing measures. When the regime
is locked in international competition over territory, authoritarian leaders are compelled to
allocate greater resources to the army even when domestic incentives to undermine the power
of the military establishment — for instance through the creation of parallel coercive units
— are quite pressing. Because of its symbolic, strategic, or material value, nondemocratic
regimes cannot avoid placing high value on contested territory and endowing the military
with the resources needed to compete with foreign opponents. The same organizational prac-
tices that dictators adopt to enhance military preparedness leave the army organizationally
empowered to launch and successfully execute a coup. Therein lies a harrowing dilemma for
the autocrat entangled in spatial rivalries: a strong and competent army is needed to suc-
cessfully manage territorial disputes; at the same time, an army strong enough to compete
with foreign enemies is also strong enough to threaten a dictator’s tenure.21 Authoritarian
regimes embroiled in territorial disputes with external foes are pushed to adopt organiza-
19Pilster and Bo¨hmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing?,” 363.
20R. Blake McMahon, “Circling the Wagons: Civil-Military Relations and International Disputes,” Work-
ing Paper (2015), 3.
21See the discussion in Caitlin Talmadge, “Different Threats, Different Militaries: Explaining Organiza-
tional Practices in Authoritarian Armies,” Security Studies 25, no. 1 (2016): 111-41.
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tional practices that increase the chances of military success;22 yet, these practices likely
undermine the effectiveness of coup-proofing measures, and fundamentally shape the army’s
ability to carry out a coup.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The first section discusses how
autocrats’ coup-proofing strategies (counterbalancing, loyalty buy-off, ethnic stacking) can
be eroded by both domestic and external structural conditions. The second section exam-
ines the mechanisms through which spatial rivalry can create favorable circumstances for
the army to attempt and successfully execute a coup against a dictator. Following that, the
third section tests empirically the key proposition which anticipates a higher incidence of
coups against autocrats in the presence of spatial rivalry. Finally, the last section concludes
and offers suggestions for further research.
Autocrats and Coup-proofing
Dictators’ survival in power is insecure. Threats at irregular removal from office can come
either from outside or inside the country. From the outside, an autocrat’s tenure can be
affected by economic sanctions,23 military intervention,24 or international disputes.25 From
the inside, an autocrat’s survival in office can be imperiled by economic shocks,26 violent or
22Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).
23Abel Escriba`-Folch and Joseph Wright, “Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival
of Authoritarian Rulers,” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 2 (2010): 335-59; Nikolay Marinov, “Do
Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 564-76.
24Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change
Rarely Leads to Democratization,” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 90-131.
25Arbatli and Arbatli, “External Threats and Political Survival;” Belkin and Schofer, “Coup Risk.”
26Nam Kyu Kim, “Revisiting Economic Shocks and Coups,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 1
(2016): 3-31.
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nonviolent protests,27 and by elements within the autocrat’s selectorate — the set of indi-
viduals and institutions that guarantee a regime’s survival.28 Autocrats rule in the shadow
of potential coups d’e´tat executed by the military — their survival in power ultimately de-
pends on the extent to which they keep the military weak or subservient.29 The longevity
of an autocrat’s tenure is a function of the effectiveness of coup-proofing measures, the set
of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup.30
To shield themselves from coups, autocrats are often compelled to weaken the army and
erode the state building project.31 Dictators’ imperative of surviving in office provides the im-
petus for the implementation of three common coup-proofing measures — counterbalancing,
loyalty buy-off, and ethnic stacking — that are designed to reduce the army’s organizational
effectiveness and minimize coup risk. Counterbalancing involves building parallel military
and security forces that are loyal to the dictator rather than the state. Feaver notes that
dictators typically counterbalance by setting various branches of the military against each
other, using parallell chains of command, and establishing alternative coercive structures,
such as paramilitary forces, secret police, or presidential guards, as counterweights to the reg-
ular army.32 Where counterbalancing is present, we typically see the military underfunded,
27Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Jeff Goodwin, No Way Out: States and Revolution-
ary Movements (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nepstad, “Mutiny and Nonviolence in the
Arab Spring.”
28Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of
Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
29This study does not focus on when autocrats are more likely to lose power but on when coups are more
likely to be executed. A coup d’e´tat is just one possible type of irregular exit in authoritarian regimes. See
Goemans, “Which Way Out?”.
30James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,” International
Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 131-65.
31Belkin and Schofer, “Coup Risk,” 596.
32Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 211-41.
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undermanned, neglected, and isolated from the ruling coalition. In this kind of environment,
the military finds itself under “institutional siege:” resources for training and organizational
efficiency are meager; generals are excluded from the regime’s patronage networks; the officer
corps is closely monitored by the security services; the military branches are ignored at the
expense of better-funded and better-trained paramilitary forces.33 In sum, counterbalancing
reduces the army’s resources and creates coordination obstacles within the military branch.
The quintessential example of counterbalancing was Libya under Muammar Gaddafi where
the national army was sidelined by the Revolutionary Guard and other paramilitary forces
which pledged allegiance directly to the dictator rather than to the state.34
Loyalty buy-off involves securing the allegiance of the army top-brass by providing ma-
terial incentives and thus ensuring that they have a vested interest in the maintenance of
the status quo (regime survival). When top officers are lavished with private goods, they
are more likely to protect tyrannical regimes in order to ensure that their benefits continue.
Loyalty buy-off weaves an umbilical cord that bonds the regime and the army top-brass in
a relationship of mutual dependence. Material incentives can vary greatly, from managerial
positions in state enterprises or corporations owned by members of the ruling coalition, part-
nerships with private capital, kickbacks on arms trade, to outright land appropriations from
top figures in the opposition. This strategy was present in Egypt under Hosni Mubarak’s
rule (1981-2011) where high-ranking officers were wedded to the dictator through the distri-
bution of much-coveted private benefits.
Ethnic stacking involves staffing the coercive agencies (the army, security and intelligence
services) with members of the ruler’s family, clan, or ethno-religious group. This strategy is
33Holger Albrecht and Dorothy Ohl, “Exit, Resistance, Loyalty: Military Behavior during Unrest in
Authoritarian Regimes,” Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1 (2016): 38-52; Belkin and Schofer, “Coup Risk,”
596; Hicham Bou Nassif, “Generals and Autocrats: How Coup-proofing Predetermined the Military Elite’s
Behavior in the Arab Spring,” Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 2 (2015): 245-75; Erica De Bruin,
“Preventing Coups d’e´tat: How Counterbalancing Works,” Working Paper (2016).
34Notably, there was no Libyan defense ministry under Gaddafi.
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fairly common in societies where communal identities are salient and form the basis of politi-
cal mobilization.35 By appointing loyal co-ethnics, autocrats address two key principal-agent
issues: monitoring and defection.36 Co-ethnics appointed at higher echelons of power tend
to be “more loyal due to trust developed over years of repeated interactions, embeddedness
within the same social networks that facilitates information exchange and makes plotting
more difficult, and stronger in-group norms of reciprocity.”37 Ethnic stacking tends to be
prevalent in countries, such as Bahrain or Syria, where ethnic exclusion lies at the core of
the state building project.
The three types of coup-proofing strategies are fairly common in authoritarian regimes
spanning different regions and time periods. In countries from Iraq (1979-2003) or the
Philippines (1965-1986) to Romania (1965-1989) or Egypt (1981-2011), autocrats relied on
counterbalancing, loyalty buy-off, or ethnic stacking to reduce the capacity and motivation
of the army to execute a coup d’e´tat. Despite their prevalence, these tactics are not fail-proof
because they require certain conditions to produce the desired outcome (coup prevention).
In fact, coup-proofing strategies can be ineffective in the presence of internal or external
structural conditions that create problems of moral hazard. Put otherwise, the efforts aimed
at keeping the army subservient will likely be unsuccessful when certain domestic or inter-
national conditions work to cement the organizational strength of the military.
35Kristen A. Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of
Democratization in Africa,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 4 (2016): 587-616; Michael A. Makara,
“Coup-proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,” Democracy and Security 9, no. 4 (2013): 334-59.
36Theodore McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion,” Comparative Politics
42, no. 3 (2010): 333-50; Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 54, no. 3 (2010): 493-515.
37Roessler, “The Enemy Within,” 309.
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Structural Conditions and Coup-proofing
Domestically, popular protest against the regime and ensuing repression can bolster the
power of the army. When they rule under the shadow of mass rebellion, autocrats find
themselves in an unenviable position: coup-proofing measures undermine the army’s effec-
tiveness as a coercive machine but using the military to repress the opposition strengthens
the military apparatus and lowers officers’ coordination costs for staging a coup. Svolik
argues that heavy reliance on the military to suppress internal dissent produces moral haz-
ard because the resources used to stifle the opposition can also empower the generals to
act against an autocrat. Once the officers become necessary “for a regime’s survival, [they]
acquire political leverage that they can exploit. Militaries frequently do so by demanding
privileges, perks, and policy concessions that go beyond what is necessary for suppressing
the regime’s opposition — they claim a seat at the table when the spoils of their complicity
are divided.”38
When indispensable for quelling domestic unrest, the army can quickly morph from sup-
porter into rival. It is true that many authoritarian regimes rely on the security services
rather than the military to deal with quotidian dissent. It is also true that the army is
organizationally “hardwired” to regard repression as falling outside its core institutional
mission.39 Nevertheless, in most dictatorships, the army does remain the repressor of last
resort. Those authoritarian regimes that are faced with “mass, organized, and violent op-
position must integrate their militaries within their repressive apparatus by granting them
corresponding material and institutional resources. It is these resources — especially the
autonomy over personnel decisions and legal impunity for internal repression — combined
with their political pivotalness that empower militaries to intervene in politics.”40
38Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 10.
39David Pion-Berlin, Diego Esparza, and Kevin Grisham, “Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and
Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century,” Comparative Political Studies 47, no. 2 (2014): 230-59.
40Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 125.
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Coup-proofing measures might also end up being largely ineffective in the presence of civil
warfare.41 Autocrats fighting internal rebellions are faced with a dilemma: to safeguard their
hold on power they need to marginalize the armed forces, but doing so leaves them exposed
to overthrow at the hands of rebel forces. A “revolving door” strategy whereby dictators
regularly shuﬄe the top army officers to “separate the wheat from the chaff” (i.e. loyalists
from disloyalists) does not necessarily solve this dilemma because the need to fight against
anti-regime insurgents may still leave the army empowered as an institution and player who
can alter the domestic power distribution. Additionally, exclusionary coup-proofing tech-
niques might lead to the accumulation of a critical mass of alienated officers who could join
the rebel forces or help organize a rebel group themselves.42
Domestic conditions, such as protest and civil war, can seriously undercut autocrats’ ef-
forts to insulate themselves from coups. Coup-proofing strategies can be rendered ineffective
by outside forces as well. Certain external structural conditions can also work to empower
the military and make an autocrat’s political survival more tenuous. Belkin and Schofer
suggest that some autocrats strategically use international conflict to create and exacerbate
competition among military branches. According to this diversionary logic, dictators who
feel threatened domestically might engage in foreign disputes in order to promote divisions
within the armed forces and, thus, make themselves less vulnerable to a coup d’e´tat.43 The
rationale here is that “engaging in external conflict tends to create rivalries and rifts among
41Bell and Koga Sudduth, “The Causes and Outcomes of Coup;” Jonathan Powell, “Leader Survival
Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: The Paradox of Coup-proofing,” Working Paper (2015).
42Roessler, “The Enemy Within,” 315.
43Belkin and Schofer, “Coup Risk.” Other works suggest that, wary of conflict improving the army’s
standing, autocrats are more willing to make concessions to an adversary in order to keep the military weak,
or that autocrats are more open to concessions after being in power for some time because they are no
longer constrained by domestic audiences. See Giacomo Chiozza and Ajin Choi, “Guess Who Did What:
Political Leaders and the Management of Territorial Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 3
(2003): 251-78; Scott Wolford, “Threats at Home, Threats Abroad: Bargaining and War in the Shadow of
Coups and Revolutions,” International Interactions 40, no. 4 (2014): 506-32.
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military branches, thereby reducing the potential for conspiracy against the central govern-
ment.”44 Belkin and Schofer identify three main mechanisms connecting external conflict
with military divisiveness: first, army branches can offer different assessments of capability
which may hamper the country’s effectiveness in combat; second, military units can have
divergent preferences over tactics; third, various services can have a hard time allocating
credit for success or blame for defeat.
Belkin and Schofer’s argument is theoretically attractive but runs counter to at least
three strands of the literature. First, it goes against a long tradition in the sociological
literature which posits that conflict tends to bolster organizational cohesion.45 Second, it
departs from the war making–state making literature which unveils clear links between the
presence of interstate warfare and the centralization of power, including the military aspect.46
Third, it goes against more recent research that finds a robust, positive relationship between
the presence of external threat and the consolidation of the bureaucratic and coercive state
apparatus.47 I argue that a certain type of external threat — the presence of spatial ri-
valry — is especially prone to exert pressure on autocrats to maintain a powerful army and
hinder their coup-proofing efforts. Where authoritarian regimes are embroiled in territorial
disputes with international competitors, strategies that are designed to insulate the dictator
from coups are less likely to be successfully implemented. As a result, an autocrat facing
foreign rivals will be more vulnerable to being overthrown in a coup d’e´tat. The following
section elaborates this logic.
44Belkin and Schofer, “Coup Risk,” 151.
45Lewis A. Coser, The Function of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956).
46Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.
47Gibler, “Outside-in;” Thies, “War, Rivalry, and State Building.”
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How Spatial Rivalry Can Threaten an Autocrat’s Tenure
Rivalries are distinct international phenomena whereby two countries share perceptions of
threat and hostility.48 States engaged in rivalry relationships compete over material or non-
material ends, and are more prone to experience militarized interstate disputes. For example,
Greece and Turkey, two NATO-member countries, have been entangled in an uneasy rivalry
relationship since 1955, primarily over the delimitation of territorial waters and the status
of Northern Cyprus. The constant possibility of conflict is a key characteristic of rivalries.
Rivalries account for a great deal of variation in the onset, escalation, and duration of in-
terstate disputes,49 but their implications transcend the international arena. Rivalry can
generate a fundamental moral hazard in authoritarian regimes: the very resources that en-
able the military to compete internationally can also empower it to act against a dictator.
All else equal, autocrats who are immune from international competition can afford to keep
their armies small, underfunded, and out of politics. By contrast, dictators who are invested
in international rivalries must keep the military forces ready for combat even if they are
reluctant to empower a player that can threaten their survival in office.
Coup-weary autocrats involved in rivalries find themselves trapped in a vortex of irrec-
oncilable interests. To ensure their political survival, authoritarian leaders need to keep
the army weak or subservient. However, international competition increases the need for a
48William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,“ International Studies Quar-
terly 45, no. 4 (2001): 557-86. According to Thompson, rivalries exist independently of conflict. This
conceptualization of rivalry avoids the tautology inherent in the alternative, dispute density approach which
requires a certain number of militarized interstate disputes (6) to occur over a certain period (20 years). See
James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, “The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns,”
Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 3 (2006): 331-48.
49Michael Colaresi, Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Po-
sition, Space, and Conflict Escalation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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strong military.50 Uncertainty over the evolution of the external threat environment creates
disincentives for weakening the armed forces, even among coup-phobic despots who cannot
afford to keep their armies unprepared to withstand a foreign rival. Autocrats need the
specialized skills of the military to compete internationally even if this competition might be
perilous for the regime. Given its core institutional mission as the “guardian of the state,”
the army is uniquely equipped to deal with external threats.51 Not only is the military better
informed about the strategic environment than the executive, it is also the repository of the
country’s hard power and the ultimate guarantor of the state’s existence. The words of a
retired Egyptian general are emblematic of how the army perceives its core mission: “The
backbone of [the country] is its armed forces. If they break, so does [the country]. They are
the state’s protector, and, if they fail, the state will collapse.”52
Authoritarian regimes involved in international rivalries cannot afford to keep a loyal
but poorly equipped and incompetent military. The need to empower the armed forces in
order to deal with foreign rivals places dictators in a tenuous position. Autocrats face a
trade-off: to compete successfully with a rival state, they must consolidate a domestic player
that is most likely to threaten their tenure — the army. Rivalry provides the opportunity
for the military to maximize its material well-being, achieve greater autonomy, and increase
its leverage among domestic actors. When rivalry persists, we are likely to see the military
establishment acquiring greater institutional power and securing a “reserved role” in the
affairs of the country. International competition transforms the generals into veto players
to be reckoned with. Facing powerful external rivals, authoritarian leaders have little choice
but to endow the military with resources and concede to officers’ institutional demands. In
50For experimental evidence of the impact of coup-proofing on military effectiveness, see Andrew W.
Bausch, “Coup-proofing and Military Inefficiencies: An Experiment,” Working Paper (2015).
51Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1977).
52Retired Egyptian general quoted in Hicham Bou Nassif, “Coups and Nascent Democracies: The Military
and Egypt’s Failed Consolidation,” Democratization 24, no. 1 (2017): 157-74.
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short, rivalry makes the army an autocrat’s indispensable foe.53
Paradoxical as it may seem at first sight, coup-proofed armies are in an autocrat’s best
and worst interest. Dictators are caught in a vicious cycle. To fend off army challengers, they
must subdue the military establishment; at the same time, they need a powerful army to
navigate through potentially treacherous “international waters.” Unlike the army top-brass,
civilian rulers operate with incomplete information about the nature of external threats.
Because of this informational asymmetry (and because officers often have rational incentives
to withhold information from civilian rulers), dictators cannot afford to underestimate the
nature of the external threat and expose themselves to foreign rivals.54 Hence, they can-
not afford to keep the army weak. Uncertainty about external threats compels dictators to
maintain a strong military, one that could also turn against the regime.
Some may argue that authoritarian leaders are mainly concerned with domestic matters
and care less about the international environment. According to this logic, the organiza-
tional effects of rivalry on the armed forces are limited, if not inexistent. Yet, international
53Some argue that leaders who coup-proof their militaries can strategically resort to substitution policies in
order to offset their military weakness when faced with external threats. See Cameron S. Brown, Christopher
J. Fariss, and R. Blake McMahon, “Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and
Strategic Substitution,” International Interactions 42, no. 1 (2016): 1-30. According to Brown, Farris, and
McMahon, to compensate for military weakness induced by coup-proofing measures, regimes contemplate two
strategic substitutes: development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and alliances. Neither of these
tools are, however, readily available to autocrats. Pursuing WMDs is a costly undertaking, materially and
strategically. This tactic can increase the number of rivals, thus inflaming the external threat environment,
or can raise the prospect of foreign intervention. As for alliances, dictators are walking a thin line here as
well given the tendency of autocratic states to democratize within alliance systems. See Douglas M. Gibler,
and Scott Wolford, “Alliances, Then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship between Regime Type
and Alliance Formation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 1 (2006): 129-53.
54This rationale is elegantly laid out in R. Blake McMahon, “Circling the Wagons.” See also Risa
A. Brooks, Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008).
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behavior has important consequences for autocrats’ tenure. An authoritarian leader can be
overthrown when a rival state intervenes against the regime, like it happened in 1990 with
the Chadian dictator Hisse`ne Habre´ who was deposed following direct involvement from the
newly-formed Islamic government in Sudan. Additionally, poor international performance
has audience costs and may erode an autocrat’s legitimacy with the population or with key
actors within the selectorate.55 Further, feeble resistance against a rival state has reputa-
tional consequences as it signals regime weakness and can encourage external and internal
challengers to mobilize against the regime.56 Therefore, a despot at the helm of a country
entangled in rivalry cannot remain impassive to the international milieu.
Rivalry is an aggregate concept encompassing several types of competitive relationships
with varying implications for the institutional strength of the military and, thus, with differ-
ent consequences for its ability to execute a coup. Thompson identifies four types of rivalries:
spatial rivalries which pertain to disputes over territory (e.g., Algeria and Morocco, 1962 -
ongoing); positional rivalries which capture contention over relative influence and status
(e.g., Egypt and Syria between 1961 and 1990); ideological rivalries which relate to disputes
over ideology (e.g., Colombia and Venezuela, 1831 - ongoing); interventionist rivalries which
refer to external intervention in the internal affairs of one country by the other state in the
rivalry dyad (e.g., Ethiopia and Somalia, 1960 - ongoing).57
I surmise that, of the four types of rivalry relationships, those over contested territory
55Jessica L. Weeks, “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International
Conflict,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (2012): 326-47.
56Regimes with coup-proofed armies tend to be less effective in interstate conflicts. Ulrich Pilster and To-
bias Bo¨hmelt, “Coup-proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967-99,” Conflict Management
and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (2011): 331-50.
57Michael Colaresi and William R. Thompson, “Strategic Rivalries, Protracted Conflict, and Crisis Esca-
lation,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 3 (2002): 263-87. The four types of rivalries are non-mutually
exclusive, i.e. a dyad can experience more than one type of rivalry at the same time. For example, the
Russo-Chinese strategic rivalry between 1958 and 1989 was simultaneously positional, spatial, and ideologi-
cal.
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are more likely to exacerbate the problem of moral hazard in authoritarian regimes. Spatial
rivalry is likely to be more salient than other types of rivalries due to the symbolic, strate-
gic, or material qualities of the territory contested with a foreign adversary.58 Symbolically,
a disputed territory can be imbued with nationalist overtones and can be regarded as the
source of group identity and survival. A contested area can be perceived as an “ancestral
homeland,” a “reservoir of national identity,” or as a “place of belonging” that harbors
widespread symbolic appeal with elites and masses alike. Strategically, the geographical
location of a territory, for example its proximity to a rival’s capital city or to international
shipping lanes, imparts considerable military value. Materially, a disputed landmass can be
economically valuable if it contains mineral resources or other types of taxable assets, such as
an industrial infrastructure or large population. Because of its symbolic, strategic, and ma-
terial value, authoritarian regimes cannot avoid placing high value on contested territory and
endowing the military with the resources needed to compete with foreign adversaries. At the
same time, the resources allocated for international competition over disputed territory are
organizationally rewarding for the military establishment and can enable it to successfully
orchestrate a coup against an autocratic leader. Therefore, resource allocation is the main
mechanism through which spatial rivalry exacerbates the problem of moral hazard in dicta-
torial regimes and increases the army’s ability to supply coups. In the presence of territorial
disputes, autocrats are compelled to make substantial investments in their militaries. Exter-
nal threat bolsters generals’ domestic bargaining power and often ensures that the military
budget remains robust.59 Overall, external threat “drives leaders to boost military spending,
58On the symbolic, strategic, and material value of territory, see, inter alia, Stacie E. Goddard, “Uncom-
mon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” International Organization, 60, no. 1
(2006): 35-68; Friederike L. Kelle, “To Claim or Not to Claim? How Territorial Value Shapes Demands for
Self-Determination,” Comparative Political Studies (forthcoming); David S. Siroky and John Cuffe, “Lost
Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism,” Comparative Political Studies 48, no. 1 (2015): 3-34.
59Vincenzo Bove and Roberto Nistico`, “Military in Politics and Budgetary Allocations,” Journal of Com-
parative Economics 42, no. 4 (2014): 1065-78.
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increase the role of the military in society, elevate military elites to more prominent public
positions, and grant the military rights and privileges (e.g., instituting martial law) that are
not afforded during peace-time.”60
Besides the consolidation of organizational resources, there are additional pathways
through which spatial rivalry can affect the military’s ability to supply coups. Rivalry con-
tributes to the professionalization of the officer corps, reinforces the role of the military as the
“guardian of the state,” and puts it in a unique position to challenge an autocrat’s tenure.
The country’s involvement in territorial disputes can shape recruitment processes, training
protocols, operational know-how, and even socialization experiences.61 The military’s op-
erational procedures aimed at countering external threats can foster not only rank-and-file
subordination, rigor, and discipline, but also an esprit de corps that habituates top officers
and lower-ranked cadres into a common institutional culture. This has important implica-
tions for the ability of the military establishment to oust a tyrant since the same profesional
skills and operational procedures that allow the army to compete with foreign rivals can be
deployed against a dictator as well.
Furthermore, spatial rivalry can foster improved coordination of collective action efforts
across various army units. External threats can increase group cohesion, facilitate monitor-
ing, and ease mobilization for collective action.62 Successful coups often require horizontal
and vertical coordination — coordination within and across various branches of the military
branch.63 Spatial rivalry facilitates inter-branch communication and operational coordina-
tion: to successfully compete with a foreign adversary, the army needs to achieve high levels
60Bell and Koga Sudduth, “The Causes and Outcomes of Coup,” 7.
61Amelia H. Green, “The Commander’s Dilemma: Creating and Controlling Armed Group Violence
Against Civilians,” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 5 (2016): 619-32.
62Gibler and Miller, “External Territorial Threat.”
63Andrew T. Little, “Coordination, Learning, and Coups,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming);
Naunihal Singh, Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2015).
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of inter-unit cooperation. Once seamless coordination among the top-brass and between the
top-brass and the rank-and-file is accomplished, the military will be more confident in its
efforts to maintain a strong posture vis-a`-vis an international rival. At the same time, with
greater inter-branch coordination, the military will also gain greater confidence in its ability
to overthrow a nondemocratic ruler.
In general, coups are most likely to be initiated, and to succeed, at higher thresholds
of plotter capacity. Because of territory’s salience for domestic audiences, spatial rivalry
consolidates the army’s capacity, in terms of resources and inter-branch communication, not
only to withstand a foreign opponent but also to plot a coup against an authoritarian leader.
These arguments do not imply that spatial rivalry invariably fosters homogeneous prefer-
ences within the military establishment regarding the institution’s corporate interests and
strategy vis-a`-vis a domestic authoritarian leader. The armed forces are not organizational
monoliths; in fact, many armies, especially those in nondemocratic countries, display some
degree of factionalism within the officer corps, not least because of rulers’ coup-proofing
efforts.64 While spatial rivalry may not automatically encourage preference homogenization
regarding the army’s domestic posture, the resources allocated to the military and the level
of inter-branch coordination needed to confront a foreign adversary can be strategically uti-
lized by segments of the top brass to oust an autocratic leader.
The high levels of army resources, professionalization, and coordination that can be
achieved in spatial rivalry situations exacerbate the problem of credible commitment in au-
thoritarian regimes. In dictatorships, civilian leaders have a hard time committing that they
will safeguard the army’s corporate interests while officers have a hard time committing
that they will not plot regime overthrow.65 Particularly pernicious is the level of informa-
64Terence Lee, “The Military’s Corporate Interests,” Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 3 (2008): 491-502.
65Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni, “A Theory of Military Dictatorships,” Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2, no. 1 (2010): 1-42; Philip Keefer, “Insurgency and Credible
Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies,” The World Bank Economic Review 22, no. 1 (2008): 33-61;
R. Blake McMahon and Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Guardianship Dilemma.”
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tional asymmetry between the ruler and the military: officers are rarely fully informed about
autocrats’ true intentions, whereas dictators can never be certain that an organizationally
endowed army will remain quartered and refrain from intervening in domestic politics. Spa-
tial rivalry can reduce the uncertainty about resource allocations, but can also leave the
army structurally empowered to scheme against a dictator. As a result, autocrats have fur-
ther incentives to engage in coup-proofing; this, in turn, can lead to a spiral of domestic
uncertainty since the military will feel directly thereatened by rival agencies. Coup-proofing
measures infringe into the army’s corporate interests and might push officers to contemplate
regime overthrow, especially when the military establishment enjoys resources allocated to
compete with an international rival. Essentially, coup-proofing efforts, coupled with the
army’s ability to safeguard institutional resources under a spatial rivalry scenario, can lead
to domestic bargaining failures and can undermine rulers’ and officers’ commitment to the
status quo.
Credible commitment problems are less salient in established democracies where the
civil-military bargain is self-reinforcing.66 The system of checks and balances in consolidated
democratic regimes acts as an enforcer of the social contract between the army and the
civilian authorities. Democratic leaders can make more credible promises to the military
establishment than their nondemocratic counterparts (reneging on the domestic power dis-
tribution bargain can result in electoral loss), which is likely to reduce officers’ appetite for
coup plotting. Unlike despots who have leverage over resource allocation and incentives to
engage in rent-seeking behavior, democratic rulers are compelled to allocate military expen-
ditures to provide the public good of national security.67 Some argue that democratizing
regimes may be uniquely prone to coups because leaders cannot fully commit to safeguard
the army’s interests while the military cannot fully commit to reform and accept civilian
66Singh, Seizing Power, 55.
67Jonathan M. Powell, “Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 58, no. 1 (2014): 169-96.
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control.68 Nonetheless, leaders of democratizing countries facing international rivals are
better positioned to credibly commit to the domestic political bargain that safeguards the
army’s corporate interests. This is so for at least two reasons: first, democratizing leaders
are domestically contrained to implement coup-proofing measures; and, second, “when there
is an international threat, concessions from democratic regimes to the military become more
credible because democracy also needs the military.”69
To summarize the theoretical rationales elaborated above, spatial rivalry widens the cred-
ibility gap between officers and dictators because it strenghens the army’s organizational
power and, hence, provides further incentives for authoritarian rulers to expand their coup-
proofing tactics. The deepening credible commitment predicament for autocratic regimes
embroiled in territorial disputes can provide a fertile ground for a coup d’e´tat. By consoli-
dating army resources, fostering officer professionalization, and reducing coordination costs,
spatial rivalry can undermine a dictator’s coup-proofing tactics and can increase the army’s
ability to supply coups. Therefore, the main theoretical expectation to be tested holds that:
H: Coups against autocrats are more likely to be initiated and to be
successful when the regime is engaged in spatial rivalry.
Dictators need strong armies to guard against external threats, but a strong military can
undermine their coup-proofing strategies and leave them prone to being ousted. There are
various processes through which spatial rivalry can undercut autocrats’ coup-proofing plans.
As argued above, given the high salience of territorial competition, authoritarian leaders
might be reluctant or unable to sideline the military establishment. Counterbalancing —
the creation of paramilitary units or alternative coercive structures that compete with one
68Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni, “A Theory of Military Dictatorships;” Curtis Bell, “Coup d’e´tat and
Democracy,” Comparative Political Studies 49, no. 9 (2016): 1167-1200.
69Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni, “A Theory of Military Dictatorships,” 37.
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another for resources and influence — might sap military morale and might reduce the coun-
try’s ability to mobilize effectively against an external adversary. De Bruin suggests that
counterbalancing exacerbates tensions with the military top-brass, and could even provoke
the coups it is designed to prevent.70 Spatial rivalry might also temper an autocrat’s appetite
to stack the army with co-ethnics or co-religionists. Despots who attempt to build ethnic
armies risk provoking violent resistance from a rivalry-empowered military establishment.71
While dictators prefer loyal generals, loading the armed forces with loyalists may decrease
army preparedness in dealing with external threats. When confronted with the insecurity
of the external realm, rulers want to hire the most competent generals who may not be
the most loyal ones. Even loyalty buy-off measures can be compromised in the context of
international competition. Generals included in an autocrat’s inner circle might be showered
with private benefits; however, a dictator has no guarantee that those generals will not defect
to the opposition or will not aspire to higher positions of authority, particularly when their
domestic standing is solidified by a rivalry-driven militarization program.
Spatial rivalry creates demand for organizational effectiveness of the military, but an
organizationally effective army can also mount a successful coup against an authoritarian
incumbent. This is not to say, however, that officers execute coups because of rivalry dy-
namics. Rather, the argument advanced herein is that, much like protest, civil warfare,
or international conflict,72 spatial rivalry can emerge as a structural cause of coups d’e´tat
because it can empower the military, reduce officers’ coordination costs, and compromise an
autocrat’s coup-proofing measures. The coup event itself can be induced by a proximate or
triggering factor, by “a spark that sets the prairie fire.”73 The “spark” can be a personal
70De Bruin, “Preventing Coups.”
71Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State,” 6.
72Belkin and Schofer, “Coup Risk;” Bell and Koga Sudduth, “The Causes and Outcomes of Coup;”
Roessler, “The Enemy Within;” Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.
73Belkin and Schofer, “Towards a Structural Understanding;” Timur Kuran, “Sparks and Prairie Fires:
A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution,” Public Choice 61, no. 1 (1989): 41-74. Proximate or
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antagonism like the removal of Ben Bella in Algeria (1965),74 a power-sharing disagreement
like the ouster of Juan Mar´ıa Bordaberry in Uruguay (1983), a spontaneous popular revolt
like the overthrow of Nicolae Ceaus¸escu in Romania (1989), or a more organized campaign
of nonviolent resistance like the downfall of Hosni Mubarak (2011) in Egypt.75
Therefore, spatial rivalry can operate as a structural condition that provides conditions
for the army to orchestrate and successfully carry out coup plots. The consensus in the lit-
erature on civil-military relations is that the perceived likelihood that a coup will succeed is
a key consideration that motivates coup plotters to depose a leader. When deciding whether
to initiate a coup, officers carefully weigh the prospects of success; failure can be institu-
tionally and personally devastating. If, as argued herein, spatial rivalry enhances the army’s
organizational effectiveness and lowers coordination costs, then the military top brass will
be more confident in their chances of overthrowing a dictator. Hence, the presence of spatial
rivalry would shape both the desire to launch coups as well as the ability to carry them out
successfully. The next section provides an empirical test of the key theoretical expectation.
triggering factors can be more idiosyncratic than structural drivers of coup d’e´tat like protest, civil war,
interstate conflict, or spatial rivalry.
74On the acrimony between Ben Bella and Boumediene, see Ottaway and Ottaway, Algeria. After assum-
ing power, Boumediene banned the use of Ben Bella’s name in state-controlled media outlets.
75The latter three events are conventionally described as revolutions but are more accurately understood
as popular coups – military coups executed in the background of mass unrest. See Natasha Ezrow and Erica
Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships (New York: Continuum, 2011); Jeff Goodwin, No Way Out: States and
Revolutionary Movements, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). In Romania, the military refused
to repress the uprising and summarily executed Ceaus¸escu along with his wife on December 25, 1989. In
February 2011, the Egyptian army swiftly changed its strategy away from repression, remained quartered,
and finally forced Mubarak out of office.
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Empirical Approach
The main hypothesis is tested using a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset for all non-
democratic regimes during the 1960-2006 period. The unit of analysis is the country-year.
Because of endogeneity problems and the rather arbitrary thresholds for regime type in the
Polity IV data, I use the alternative measure for autocratic regimes developed by Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz.76 Coup attempt and coup success are nonrandomly distributed events;
consequently, I estimate them simultaneously. Since I am assessing the impact of spatial
rivalry on both coup attempt and coup success, I rely on a two-stage Heckman selection
model.77 Given the dichotomous nature of the outcomes of interest — coup attempt and coup
success — I employ the probit-probit variation of Heckman’s two-stage selection model which
is appropriate for ascertaining the impact of predictors on coup success by incorporating the
predicted probability of a coup attempt taking place.78 Running a two-stage probit-probit
selection model implies obtaining estimates for the first stage of the processs (coup attempt),
76Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions:
A New Data Set,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 2 (2014): 313-31. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz code
for autocratic regime onset when any of the following occurs: a government assumes power through non-
competitive elections; a government assumes power through competitive elections but subsequently changes
the formal or informal rules such that competition in subsequent elections is limited; a government assumes
power through competitive elections, but the military either prevents one or more parties that substantial
numbers of citizens would be expected to vote for from competing, or dictates policy choice in important
policy areas. The Polity IV index includes a category of extreme factionalism, where domestic competition
is “intense, hostile, and frequently violent.” This is particularly problematic for coup- and civil war-prone
countries because the Polity IV regime measure is not independent of the outcome of interest. See the
discussion in James R. Vreeland, “The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (2008): 401-25.
77James J. Heckman. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,” Econometrica 47, no. 1 (1979):
153-61.
78This is also known as the bivariate probit model with selection or the censored probit model. Censored
probit is equivalent to running two probit models with correlated errors.
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saving a selection bias term, and using it to correct the estimates in the outcome stage (coup
success). If coup attempt and coup success are interdependent processes, the probit-probit
selection model would account for this interdependence. To address the problem of country-
specific error correlations, I report robust standard errors clustered at the country level. One
remaining challenge with this type of analysis is that the occurrence of a coup is unlikely to
be independent of previous coups. To account for temporal dependence and structural coup
risk (recurrent coups in the same country), I include a measure of the number of years since
the previous coup with associated cubic splines.79
Variables
The dependent variables of interest, coup attempt and coup success, are taken from the most
comprehensive coup dataset to date.80 Coup attempt refers to an attempt “by the military
or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of government using
unconstitutional means.” A coup attempt is considered to be successful “if the perpetrators
seize and hold power for at least seven days.”81
The main hypothesis states that spatial rivalry is positively associated with coups. Spatial
rivalry is coded 1 for each year an authoritarian regime was engaged in rivalry over territory,
and 0 otherwise with (updated) data taken from Thompson.82 According to Thompson’s
conceptualization, the onset of rivalry is marked by “explicit threat, competitor, and enemy
perceptions on the part of decision-makers” while the termination of rivalry occurs when
79Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, “Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-
Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable,” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (1998):
1260-88. Past coup is one of the most robust predictors of future coup. See Theodore McLauchlin, “Loyalty
Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion,” Comparative Politics 42, no. 3 (2010): 333-50; Thompson,
“Regime Vulnerability.”
80Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups.”
81Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups,” 252.
82Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries.”
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there is historical “evidence of some explicit kind of a significant de-escalation in threat
perception and hostility.”83 To assess the veracity of main theoretical expectation, I also in-
clude binary indicators for other rivalry subtypes – positional, ideological, and interventionist
– with information taken again from Thompson’s updated dataset. The key argument holds
that spatial rivalries are likely to produce organizationally coherent armies that can also act
against the ruler when they find politically expedient to do so. By contrast, positional and
ideological rivalries could plausibly be maintained without necessarily endowing the army
with disproportionately large amounts of resources. These types of confrontations are less
intense and frequently unfold in the political rather than the military realm. Given their
reduced escalatory potential, they may not create the same level of demand for organization-
ally efficient armies as is the case with spatial rivalries. In the case of interventionist rivalries,
the army tends to be weakened by the intervening state so, if anything, we might expect
these types of rivalries to reduce the incidence of coups. Because a country can experience
multiple types of rivalries at the same time, dichotomous indicators for all types of rivalries
are included simultaneously in the model specifications.
Besides the presence of spatial rivalry, the theoretical discussion espoused three other
structural conditions that can produce problems of moral hazard: domestic instability, civil
war, and interstate conflict. Since each of them provides avenues for the military to con-
solidate its institutional power and carry out a coup against an authoritarian leader when
the occasion arises, they need to be taken into consideration. To capture the impact of do-
mestic instability on the army’s institutional power, I rely on the anti-government resistance
campaign variable from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO)
dataset.84 With an increase in domestic instability, an autocrat may be compelled to appeal
83Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries,” 563-66.
84Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0
Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 415-23. I use the NAVCO 2.0 indicator for the size of
anti-government campaigns which I recode according to the following categories: 1© <1,000 protestors; 2©
<10,000 protestors; 3© <100,000 protestors; 4© <500,000 protestors; 5© <1 million protestors; 6© >1 million
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to the armed forces to quell uprisings. By doing so, however, the dictator may be exposed
to the possibility of being ousted in a coup.85
The impact of internal conflict on military consolidation is factored in through the civil
war covariate taken from the Correlates of War (COW) project. COW defines civil war as a
conflict fought within state borders between a government and non-government forces where
at least 1,000 battle-related deaths are recorded per year.86 The COW dataset is also utilized
to capture the presence of interstate war in any given year. COW defines interstate war as a
conflict fought by two states, involving organized forces and resulting in a minimum of 1,000
combatant fatalities within a twelve month period.87 To gauge the impact of militarized
interstate disputes (MIDs) — militarized actions against rival states — on the power consol-
idation of the military establishment, I include three covariates: the country’s involvement
in MIDs (coded dichotomously); the number of MIDs in each observed country-year (count
variable); and the time from last MID to coup attempt (years). A militarized action can be
the threat to use force, the display of force, or the actual use of force. MID data are also
taken from the Correlates of War project.
protestors.
85Bell and Koga Sudduth, “The Causes and Outcomes of Coup;” Powell, “Leader Survival Strategies;”
Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.
86The COW civil war variable is more appropriate than alternative categorizations (e.g., UCDP) because
it captures high-intensity conflict – that is, those episodes of civil strife where we are most likely to see
full involvement of the armed forces. See David Pion-Berlin, Diego Esparza, and Kevin Grisham, “Staying
Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century,” Comparative Polit-
ical Studies 47, no. 2 (2014): 230-59). Low-intensity insurgencies (captured by the UCDP categorization,
which requires at least 25 battle-related deaths) often involve the security services rather than the military;
by contrast, high-intensity civil wars typically require the army’s involvement which may have, as argued in
this study, important implications for an autocrat’s survival. Another problem with the UCDP 25 battle-
casualty threshold is that it may capture forms of political contention other than civil war. As shown in the
Supplementary Materials, models with the UCDP civil war variable produce comparable results.
87Meredith R. Sarkees, “The Correlates of War Data on War,” Conflict Management and Peace Science
18, no. 1 (2000): 123-44.
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Further, I factor in four control variables that account for the military’s and the pop-
ulation’s dissatisfaction with the regime.88 An autocrat’s survival in office is likely to be
more fragile when the rank-and-file are poorly funded: aggrieved soldiers and officers tend
to be less invested in the maintenance of the status quo. Hence, the first control variable
is the change (∆) in military expenditures as percentage of the GDP (percent year-to-year
differences). The expectation is that a positive change in military expenditures is likely
to reduce the likelihood of coups.89 The second control variable, military expenditures per
soldier (logged), gauges military grievances as well, more precisely contentment with the al-
location of resources to the armed forces. This covariate also captures indirectly the quality
of the military equipment since “states that spend more money per soldier are likely to have
soldiers with more training and better equipment.”90 Intuitively, the expectation is that
coups are less likely with higher military expenditures.
Two other controls function as barometers for an authoritarian regime’s legitimacy in
the eyes of the population. The country’s general economic performance is thought to tem-
per the citizenry’s coup spirit: the populace may not be that welcoming to coups when the
economy is doing well and personal welfare is improving.91 To assess citizens’ predisposition
towards coups, I include two variables that capture the country’s overall economic perfor-
mance: change (∆) in GDP and GDP per capita (logged). The rationale here holds that
coups would be less welcomed by the average individual when the country registers increases
in both measures of economic performance. Additionally, I take into account three other
88Data on these four control variables are taken from Jonathan M. Powell, “Determinants of the Attempt-
ing and Outcome of Coups d’E´tat,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 6 (2012): 1017-40.
89Scholars have consistently argued that low military spending might encourage coups. See Norlinger,
“Soldiers in Politics,” Vincenzo Bove and Robert Nistico, “Coups d’E´tat and Defense Spending: A Counter-
factual Analysis,” Public Choice 161, no. 3 (2014): 321-44, and Gabriel Leon, “Loyalty for Sale? Military
Spending and Coups d’E´tat,” Public Choice 159, no. 3 (2014): 363-83.
90Powell, “Determinants,” 1027.
91Belkin and Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding.”
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potential confounders: a measure of dictators’ coup-proofing strategy; a measure of military
organization, i.e. whether authoritarian armies rely on conscription or voluntary recruit-
ment; and a measure of alliances.92 For the coup-proofing variable, I rely on the measure
developed by Pilster and Bo¨hmelt.93 Specifically, Pilster and Bo¨hmelt estimate a regime’s
degree of coup-proofing by its level of counterbalancing. To come up with an accurate mea-
sure of counterbalancing, the authors construct an index which includes not only the number
of rival paramilitary organizations within a state but also their relative power.94 It is worth
noting that this index measures the extent of counterbalancing that is taking place within a
country’s military by focusing on “ground-combat compatible military organizations,” which
are most likely to be used against domestic opponents. The conscription variable is coded
dichotomously and comes from the Toronto dataset.95 The intuition here is that, with draft
armies, the rank-and-file may be less inclined to partake in coup attempts for fear of losing
a privileged domestic status. As for alliances, dictators who operate under the protective
umbrella of defense pacts may be more confident in maintaining weaker armed forces. Hence,
they may engage in more extensive coup-proofing, which would decrease coup prospects. The
presence of defensive alliances in a given country-year is coded from the Correlates of War
dataset. Finally, I control for whether a military regime is in power with data taken from
Geddes, Wright, and Franz.96 Past research has consistently found that military regimes
are particularly vulnerable to coups; moreover, it is worth examining whether armies might
rally around the military leader in the presence of territorial disputes.
92We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for suggesting these additional controls.
93Pilster and Bo¨hmelt, “Coup-proofing and Military Effectiveness.”
94The construction of the counterbalancing index is described at length in Pilster and Bo¨hmelt, “Do
Democracies Engage Less in Coup-proofing?”, 360-61.
95Victor Asal, Justin Conrad, and Nathan Toronto, “I Want You! The Determinants of Military Con-
scription,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming).
96Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown.”
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Results
Table 1 displays the results from the two-stage Heckman selection model for attempted and
successful coups against autocrats.97 All models report probit coefficients. As argued in
the recent literature, the covariates, with the exception of those capturing time since last
coup or time since last MID, can be theoretically linked to both coup attempts and coup
outcomes;98 therefore, they enter both the selection and the outcome equations. For those
variables that appear in both the selection and outcome equations, the coefficients in the
outcome equations are affected by the coefficients in the selection equation. The outcome
coefficients estimate the probability of a coup succeeding conditional on a putsch having
been attempted in the first place.
The main hypothesis posited that the presence of spatial rivalry is likely to increase the
probability of coups. As we can see from Models 1 through 3, the results are congruent with
the key theoretical expectation: autocrats invested in territorial disputes with foreign rivals
are more prone to be ousted in a coup d’e´tat. Spatial rivalry is consistently associated with
attempts and successes across alternative specifications that account for factors convention-
ally associated with coups. To assess the substantive impact of territorial rivalry on the
outcome of interest, I estimated the conditional marginal effects of spatial rivalry on coup
success.99 Holding all other variables constant, we can notice an increase of 33.4 percent in
the likelihood of coup success in the presence of spatial rivalry for the full model (Model
97As shown in the Supplementary Materials, the results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls
such as the presence of coups in a neighboring country (to account for spatial dependence) or oil revenues,
the exclusion of the interstate war and MID variables due to collinearity concerns with the rivalry covariate,
the use of alternative coding for the civil war variable, and the substitution of cubic splines with a cubic
polynomial of duration.
98See, for instance, the modeling strategy in Powell, “Determinants.”
99Beyond their sign and statistical significance, Heckman coefficients do not adequately convey substantive
effects. Heckman post-estimation commands in Stata 13 were used to derive conditional marginal effects of
spatial rivalry on coup success.
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3).100 To further illustrate how spatial rivalry influences the outcome of interest, Figure
1 displays the effect of spatial rivalry on the change in the predicted probability of coups
at different levels of GDP per capita (logged).101 Altogether, it can be observed that the
probability of a coup against dictators increases when authoritarian regimes are embroiled
in territorial disputes. The effect of spatial rivalry on the change in the predicted probability
of coups is positive and statistically different from 0. At the same time, the impact of spatial
rivalry is greater at lower levels of GDP per capita, such that, all else equal, a dispute over
territory can increase the overall probability of a coup happening by at least 5 percent. At
higher levels of GDP per capita, the effect of spatial rivalry is more modest, although it does
remain statistically significant. These trends suggest that, where dictators manage to main-
tain a relatively high standard of living (an example is Singapore during the “benevolent”
dictatorship of Lee Kuan Yew, 1965–1990), the impact of spatial rivalry on the likelihood of
a coup is significantly lower.
Overall, the relationship between spatial rivalry and coups exhibits robust statistical sig-
nificance, and empirically corroborates the mechanisms that link the presence of territorial
disputes to greater organizational power, coordination, and political leverage for the mili-
tary establishment. Autocrats have much to fear when the country is involved in territorial
disputes. As shown consistently in the rivalry literature, these type of disputes are more
likely to escalate to outright warfare;102 additionally, the presence of external threat is likely
to produce an organizationally effective military, one that may find itself in an auspicious
position to attempt and successfully carry out a coup. The empirical patterns revealed across
Models 1 through 3 present an alternative to the conventional view in the civil-military lit-
erature which posits that the presence of external threat makes the military less likely to
100The baseline probability of coup success with no spatial rivalry stands at 0.09. The probability of a
successful putch increases to 0.13 when the regime is engaged in a territorial dispute with a foreign rival.
101As can be seen in Table 1, GDP per capita (logged) is a consistent inhibitor of coups.
102Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics; Senese and Vasquez, The Steps
to War.
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challenge the executive’s authority. Foundational studies on civil-military relations hold that
increasing resources, autonomy, and organizational power of the army produces congenial or
“positive” civil-military relations103 The findings herein suggest that this is not always the
case. Rather than coalesce domestic actors against a common enemy, external threats —
territorial disputes, in particular — can also create opportunities for the army to consolidate
its organizational leverage and can, thus, enhance its ability to successfully depose an au-
thoritarian leader.104 While there is ample evidence pointing to a strong connection between
spatial rivalry and coups, the estimates for the other types of rivalry (positional, ideological,
and interventionist) are less promising. As Models 1 through 3 show, the coefficients for
positional and ideological rivalries fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
At the same time, suggestive evidence indicates that, all else equal, coups are less likely to
be attempted in the presence of interventionist rivalries. This is an expected pattern since
foreign interventions weaken national armies and leave them incapacitated to coordinate a
coup.105
103The conventional view is that “happy” armies, i.e. organizationally endowed militaries, are less likely to
challenge civilian leaders. See, inter alia, Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1968); Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations;” Samuel E. Finer, The Man
on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962); Samuel P. Huntington,
The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage, 1975.);
William R. Thompson, “Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup,” Comparative Politics 7, no. 4 (1975):
459-87.
104Note that the logic here applies to the presence of external threat, not to the presence of war. Autocrats
might use territorial disputes to initiate conflict and rally the population around the war effort.
105Abel Escriba`-Folch and Joseph Wright, Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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Figure 1: The effect of spatial rivalry on the change in the predicted probability of coups at
different levels of GDP per capita
When looking at the other structural coup-drivers — domestic instability, interstate
conflict, and civil war — the results are mixed. Internal instability emerges as a strong
predictor of coup attempts across all specifications, a trend that is consistent with prior
scholarship.106 With an increase in the number of protest events, an authoritarian regime
becomes more vulnerable to putsches. Nevertheless, domestic turmoil is not significantly
related with coup success. The coefficients display the expected sign, but fail to reach
conventional levels of statistical significance. This pattern requires further inquiry. It may
be the case that internal strife may provide the opportunity for the army to interve and
attempt to overthrow an unpopular dictator, but that the success of such endeavor has more
to do with the level of coordination among officers than with the motivation to intervene
in the first place. The impact of other structural conditions is equally variegated. As
mentioned above, recent works have established clear links between interstate warfare or
militarized interstate disputes and a lower coup risk.107 The estimates across all models
106Belkin and Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding;” Powell, “Determinants.”
107Arbatli and Arbatli, “External Threats and Political Survival;” Piplani and Talmadge, “When War
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presented in Table 1 suggest that interstate war is positively associated with coup attempts
but not with coup successes. Again, this finding necessitates a more elaborate investigation.
Speculatively, while a certain faction of the army may seize the opportunity to initiate a
coup attempt while the regime fights a war, the remaining officers may be reluctant to
partake in the attempted takeover because they may be apprehensive of potential defeat and
subsequent loss of status within the military establishment. It is also worth mentioning that
the presence or number of MIDs are not systematically related to coup outcomes, even in
alternative specifications where the rivalry covariates are dropped due to collinearity concerns
with the MID variables.108
The empirical results also leave us circumspect about the connection between the presence
of internal conflict and coups. The civil war covariate fails to reach conventional levels of
statistical significance. Civil war remains insignificant across all models which suggests that
its impact may be marginal once we account for the wider palette of structural coup-drivers.
When it comes to the other variables, we observe that the covariate capturing the change
in military expenditures is consistently significant in the outcome equations, suggesting a
lower likelihood of coup success when greater resources are allocated for the army. This
finding is intuitive given that the covariate for military expenditures proxies for resources
funnelled into buying the satisfaction and loyalty of army officers. Hence, while a certain
segment of the military establishment might attempt regime overthrow for political reasons,
the coup ploy is likely to unravel when the larger officer corps is satisfied with the level of
resource allocations to the armed forces. Another consistent inhibitor of coups is the level
of economic development, measured by logged GDP per capita. The estimates across all
specifications indicate that both coup attempt and coup success are unlikely to occur when
an authoritarian regime manages to maintain relatively high levels of economic development.
As argued in the existing literature, good economic performance lowers the general public’s
Helps Civil-military Relations.”
108These results are included in the Supplementary Materials.
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appetite for condoning a coup.109 Model 2 offers some suggestive evidence that military
regimes are more prone to coup attempts and coup successes compared to other types of
regimes. This finding is consonant with current scholarhip. For example, Escriba`-Folch and
Wright claim that “the preference for military unity and against factionalism make military
regimes particularly vulnerable to elite divisions. As a result, elites in these regimes are more
likely to bargain with civilian elites to negotiate a transition to democracy, especially when
the military has a credible guarantee that their corporate interests will be protected.”110
However, the effect dissipates in the full model (Model 3): the military regime variable
maintains its positive sign but is no longer statistically significant. Finally, the remaining
controls do not seem to significantly affect the outcomes. One exception is the number of
years since last MID, a variable which is strongly associated with coup attempts. This pattern
might suggest that an unresolved international dispute could enable the army to accumulate
greater institutional resources throughout time, which would leave it in a propitious position
to initiate a coup.
Conclusion
To the unseasoned observer, dictators may look like carefree individuals fully absorbed by
the mirage of power. At closer scrutiny, autocrats live a far more precarious life. This is be-
cause they need to permanently look over their shoulder and be mindful of potential coups
d’e´tat orchestrated by the army. To ensure their political survival, authoritarian leaders
generally adopt three types of coup-proofing measures: counterbalancing (divide-and-rule
tactic pitting coercive agencies against one another), loyalty buy-off (distribution of private
benefits to loyalists), and ethnic stacking (appointment of co-ethnics or co-religionists at
higher echelons of power). However, these measures might be unsuccessful in the presence of
109Recent scholarship suggests that coups can be reversed if the general public is satisfied with the status
quo. See Bell and Koga Sudduth, “The Causes and Outcomes of Coup,” 3.
110Escriba`-Folch and Wright, Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival, 35.
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certain structural conditions that work to bolster the organizational power of the military.
This article examined the impact of one such structural condition on the military’s ability
to carry out a coup against a dictator: spatial rivalry — international competition over
territory. Spatial rivalry can undercut a despot’s coup-proofing measures by increasing the
autonomy, strength, and organizational resources of the army. In essence, territorial dis-
putes with foreign rivals create a fundamental moral hazard in authoritarian regimes: the
very resources that enable the armed forces to compete internationally also consolidate its
domestic leverage and empower it to act against a dictator. The results consistently showed
that the presence of an external rival is associated with a higher likelihood of coups. This
does not imply that generals execute coups because of spatial rivalry dynamics. Rather,
the argument advanced herein is more nuanced: rivalry operates as a structural condition
that enhances the army’s ability to supply coups. International competition over territory
provides avenues for the military to consolidate its institutional power, coordinate collective
action efforts, undermine an autocrat’s coup-proofing strategies, and execute a coup when
propitious conditions arise. Besides spatial rivalry, this study also investigated the effect of
three other structural coup-drivers — internal instability, civil war, and international con-
flict — on coups. Both domestic instability and interstate war were systematically associated
with coup attempts but not with coup outcomes, a pattern that warrants further analysis.
The results for the impact of civil war were inconclusive, particularly in light of existing
studies in which internal conflict emerges as a significant coup-driver.111 Therefore, more
attention needs to be given to the relationship between war, of intrastate or interstate fabric,
and coups.
The findings have theoretical and practical relevance. Theoretically, this study con-
tributes to the growing body of works that examine the link between international com-
petition and coups. In particular, there seems to be some consensus around the idea that
111Bell and Koga Sudduth, “The Causes and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War;” Roessler, “The Enemy
Within.”
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interstate conflicts or disputes foreclose key pathways through which generals might conspire
to overthrow a leader. Some contend that a highly militarized international environment al-
lows dictators to create rifts among officers and, thus, to strengthen control of the military
establishment.112 Others argue that wars, or even militarized interstate disputes, “may ac-
tually facilitate more harmonious, or at least less dangerous, civil-military relations. Simply
put, wars physically complicate the tasks of coup plotting and execution. More broadly, they
also focus military attention outward and reduce the likelihood that military officers will turn
their ambitions inward.”113 Another argument posits that conflict generates coup-inhibiting
“rally-around-the-flag” effects and bonds the civilian leadership with the military. Finally,
a more recent claim holds that, during high-hostility crises, leaders are able to commit more
credibly to resource transfers towards the military establishment, which is likely to decrease
officers’ appetite for ousting the leader.114
The findings in this study suggest that these mechanisms may not necessarily operate
when an authoritarian regime is engaged in spatial rivalries. Unlike war, external threat in
the form of territorial disputes may exhibit different dynamics. Because a spatial rivalry
relationship can persist for longer periods of time without escalating to outright warfare,
the coup-inhibiting pathways might be absent in this type of scenario. The presence of an
external threat environment short of actual conflict may not hinder officers’ ability to act
collectively and may not provide the autocrat with the opportunity to divert public opinion
or divide the armed forces. Instead, spatial rivalry places fewer restrictions on the military’s
ability to supply coups and empowers the generals to challenge the ruler. Because territo-
rial contests are extremely salient compared to other types of international disputes, spatial
rivalry is organizationally rewarding for the army, resulting in greater resources, autonomy,
leverage, and, thus, in greater ability to orchestrate a successful coup against an autocrat. If
112Belkin and Schofer, “Coup Risk,” 151; Chiozza and Goemans, Leaders and International Conflict ;
Goemans, “Which Way Out?”, 775.
113Piplani and Talmadge, “When War Helps,” 18.
114Arbatli and Arbatli, “External Threats and Political Survival.”
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authoritarian leaders have much to fear from the intricate effects of spatial rivalry on their
political survival, then a few questions arise: Do authoritarian regimes have less of an in-
centive to initiate a territorial contest and more of an incentive to end one? Relatedly, does
spatial rivalry incentivize dictators to act in a less conciliatory manner and escalate ongoing
disputes? These are all areas ripe for further exploration. Besides its theoretical contri-
bution, this study holds practical importance as well since it highlights an underexplored
mechanism that links international forces to domestic political instability. The consequences
of interstate rivalry are far-ranging and transcend the international realm. A number of
non-democratic states systemically troubled by contentious civil-military interactions face
external challenges. The findings herein revealed that these external challenges create be-
havioral incentives that are likely to produce, or exacerbate, both domestic and international
instability. Discerning the pathways through which a competitive international environment
impacts coup risk in non-democratic countries will allow policy-makers to gain a deeper
understanding of authoritarian breakdown or consolidation.
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Supplementary Materials
Robustness tests
Models 4 through 9 in Tables A1 and A2 present a range of additional tests which indicate
that the main results are robust to the use of an alternative civil war variable, the inclusion of
two other controls (the presence of coups in adjacent countries, and oil revenues per capita),
the exclusion of the interstate war and MID covariates due to collinearity concerns with the
spatial rivalry variable, the exclusion of all rivalry variables, and the substitution of cubic
splines with a cubic polynomial of duration.
Model 4 examines whether the results remain consistent when the COW civil war variable
is replaced with the UCDP civil war variable (which relies on a 25 battle-related casualty
threshold compared to COW’s 1,000 battle-deaths threshold). As can be seen from Table
A1, the UCDP civil war categorization does not substantially changes the nature of the main
result. Spatial rivalry remains a significant predictor of coup attempt and success. The only
notable difference is that the UCDP civil war covariate emerges as a statistically significant
predictor of coup onset. This pattern could be an artifact of civil war conceptualization and
measurement since UCDP’s 25 battle-related casualty threshold may conflate civil war with
other forms of domestic contention. The fact that the instability variable loses its signifi-
cance once the COW civil war variable is replaced with the UCDP one seems to support this
conjecture.
Model 5 investigates the possibility that military coups may exhibit demonstration ef-
fects and may, thus, influence putsches in neighboring countries.1 Events in a neighboring
state could either precipitate or inhibit coups against autocrats. Generals may learn from
foreign peers about how to successfully mount a coup or officers in adjacent states may assist
with the coup planning and execution stages; conversely, failed coups in the neighborhood
1Richard P.Y. Li and William R. Thompson, “The ‘Coup Contagion’ Hypothesis,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 19, no. 1 (1975): 63-88.
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may signal to the army top-brass that ousting a dictator is an onerous undertaking that
can jeopardize their political survival and physical security. As can be seen from Table A1,
the dichotomous indicator marking the presence of coups in an adjacent country hints at a
higher likelihood of coups attempts when coup-making activities are present in a neighboring
state, but fails to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. Hence, these results
do not support any “coup contagion” effect.
Model 6 controls for oil revenues per capita (logged) with data taken from one of the most
comprehensive studies on oil and conflict.2 Oil income may be directly tied to autocratic
regime survival: oil wealth increases military spending in dictatorships and, according to
recent research, may function as a coup deterrent.3 When looking at the results in Model 6,
we observe that oil wealth emerges as a significant inhibitor of coup attempt, but not coup
success — a pattern which suggests that dictators can use oil rents to buy off officers or sub-
sidize the creation of parallel structures of authority that are directly under their authority.
It is worth noting that the inclusion of the oil revenues per capita control does not alter the
key findings.
Model 7 probes whether the results remain consistent when the interstate war and MID
variables are excluded due to collinearity concerns with spatial rivalry. As can be seen from
Table A2, the key findings remain robust to the exclusion of the interstate war and MID
covariates. Model 8 accounts for the possibility that collinearity could further taint the im-
pact of interstate war and MIDs on coup outcomes. To account for this possibility, Model
8 reports results the main model (Model 3), but with all rivalry variables excluded. If we
take a look at Table A2, we notice that the estimates for interstate war and MIDs remain
consistent even when the rivalry variables are eliminated. Finally, Model 9 substitutes the
cubic splines with a cubic polynomial as an alternative way to account for duration depen-
2Michael Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2012). The oil covariate can also be treated as a proxy for unit effects.
3Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes, “Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival,” British
Journal of Political Science 45, no. 2 (2015): 287-306.
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dence.115 The cubic polynomial of duration (not reported, but available from the author)
produces substantively similar results to the cubic splines. To further test for unobserved
heterogeneity, additional checks were conducted with region controls; the results remained
unchanged.4
Overall, none of the robustness tests meaningfully changes the key finding: spatial ri-
valry emerges as a consistent predictor of coup attempt and coup success across alternative
specifications.
115David B. Carter and Curtis S. Signorino, “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary
Data,” Political Analysis 18, no. 3 (2010): 271-92.
4These additional checks are not reported here, but are available from the author.
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